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A B S T R A C T
Three studies are presented which provide a mixed methods exploration of ﬁngerprint analysis. Using a
qualitative approach (Expt 1), expert analysts used a ‘think aloud’ task to describe their process of
analysis. Thematic analysis indicated consistency of practice, and experts’ comments underpinned the
development of a training tool for subsequent use. Following this, a quantitative approach (Expt 2)
assessed expert reliability on a ﬁngerprint matching task. The results suggested that performance was
high and often at ceiling, regardless of the length of experience held by the expert. As a ﬁnal test, the
experts’ ﬁngerprint analysis method was taught to a set of naı¨ve students, and their performance on the
ﬁngerprint matching task was compared both to the expert group and to an untrained novice group (Expt
3). Results conﬁrmed that the trained students performed signiﬁcantly better than the untrained
students. However, performance remained substantially below that of the experts. Several explanations
are explored to account for the performance gap between experts and trained novices, and their
implications are discussed in terms of the future of ﬁngerprint evidence in court.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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jou r nal h o mep age: w ww.els evier . co m/lo c ate / fo r sc i in t1. Introduction
Fingerprints are commonly accepted by lay people as a highly
valuable and reliable means of identiﬁcation. Traders in early
China used their ﬁngerprints in clay seals, or on silk or paper to
legitimise documents or loans, and by C13th, Eastern doctors noted
the use of ﬁngerprints to identify people. However, it was not until
Sir Francis Galton published his classiﬁcation of ﬁngerprint
patterns that they began to attract attention in the forensic
community [1]. Resting on the principles of persistence and
individuality [2], ﬁngerprint matching has been relied upon in
court since 1892. However, today, ﬁngerprint evidence is coming
under considerable scrutiny, and questions are being raised about
its admissibility in court [3]. The purpose of the present paper is to
examine the practice of ﬁngerprint analysis, as described by
qualiﬁed ﬁngerprint experts, and to determine whether that
practice is both reliable and sufﬁcient in supporting accurate
performance.* Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, University of South-
ampton, Highﬁeld, Southampton, Hampshire, UK. Fax: +44 2380 594597.
E-mail address: svs1@soton.ac.uk (S.V. Stevenage).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2016.08.026
0379-0738/ 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open acc1.1. Reliability of ﬁngerprint evidence
Fingerprint analysis relies upon two essential principles. The
ﬁrst is persistence or permanence, which suggests that even
though ridge deﬁnition may become less distinct through habit or
occupation, ﬁngerprints do not fundamentally change with time.
The second is individuality or uniqueness, which suggests that no
two people as yet have been discovered to have the same pattern of
friction ridges. On this basis, ﬁngerprint evidence has assumed a
dominant role in court, with bold statements suggesting that
ﬁngerprint analysis is ‘infallible’ [4], and that errors are ‘virtually
impossible’ [5,6]. Consequently, ﬁngerprint evidence has earned a
reputation for ‘accuracy and objectivity’ ([7], cited in [8]). Despite
this, concern is now mounting over the accuracy of the human
operators who bear the responsibility for courtroom evidence
[9,8]. Two high-proﬁle cases illustrate the problem:
The ﬁrst case relates to Brandon Mayﬁeld who, in May 2004,
was arrested in connection with the Madrid bombings. Investi-
gators had retrieved a ﬁngerprint from the bag which held the
detonators, and an AFIS search had produced a list of comparison
ﬁngerprints. Mayﬁeld’s ﬁngerprint was the fourth on the list and a
match was conﬁrmed by an FBI analyst, and was subsequently
veriﬁed by three ﬁngerprint examiners. Worryingly, discrepancies
between the latent print and the Mayﬁeld’s ﬁngerprint wereess article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Dissatisﬁed with the FBI’s claim of a match, the Spanish police kept
the investigation open and ultimately, they arrested Ouhnane
Daoud whose ﬁngerprint was matched to the latent print. After
two weeks in custody, Brandon Mayﬁeld was released and the FBI
admitted an error (see report issued by the Ofﬁce of the Inspector
General into the FBI Mayﬁeld Case; [10]).
The second case relates to Shirley McKie, an investigating
ofﬁcer working on a Scottish murder case. She was identiﬁed from
a latent print found at the crime scene, and was charged for perjury
at denying that the latent print could have belonged to her. Whilst
a jury unanimously cleared McKie of the perjury charge, the
question of the ﬁngerprint match remained a matter of controver-
sy. Disagreement existed over the number of points of correspon-
dence required to determine an identiﬁcation, and concern was
raised over the lack of a blind veriﬁcation procedure. In 2011, the
Scottish Public Judicial Enquiry into Fingerprinting concluded that
a misidentiﬁcation had occurred (see report issued by [11]).
The concerns raised by both cases are reﬂected in a number of
notable high-proﬁle reports which collectively throw doubt over
the reliability of ﬁngerprint evidence. These include the National
Academy of Sciences report [12] which called for a committed
programme of research to deﬁne the sources of variability and bias
in human cognitive decision-making. This call is echoed more
recently in reports published by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent
Print Analysis [13] and the UK Forensic Science Regulator [14],
both of which highlight cognitive bias as a major source of human
error (see also the POSTbrief to the UK Houses of Parliament: [15]).
With this in mind, researchers have begun to scrutinise both the
process and the performance of ﬁngerprint experts in order to
address the challenging question of whether ﬁngerprint experts
‘possess abilities beyond those of a novice’ [15, p. 14].
1.2. Performance of ﬁngerprint analysts
Fingerprint analysis is conducted by trained ﬁngerprint analysts
who follow a widely accepted description of good practice known as
the ACE-V method. This acronym describes the four stages of
analysis, comparison, evaluation and veriﬁcation, and it results in one
of four outcomes: The ﬁngerprint pair may be deemed of ‘no value’
(too poor to analyse), or may be deemed to be ‘individualised’ (come
from the same source), ‘excluded’ (come from different sources) or
‘inconclusive’ (insufﬁcient evidence exists to draw a conclusion).
The method has been described by Huber [17], Ashbaugh [18] and
Champod et al. [19]. Nevertheless, several authors criticise the
method for being underspeciﬁed and thus untestable in a robust
fashion [3,20]. In particular, there is concern over the lack of
agreement, both across nations and across time [21], regarding the
number of points of correspondence required to determine a
‘match’. Whilst standards have varied between 7 (Russia), 12
(Spain) and 16 points of correspondence (UK) [21], current practice
leaves the determination of sufﬁciency of correspondence to the
expertise of the analyst. As a consequence, it is difﬁcult to fully
specify the inferential process followed by the expert.
Despite this, formal testing of the accuracy of ﬁngerprint
experts suggests that performance is good. For instance, Langen-
burg [22] reviewed a number of early studies suggesting
performance levels ranging from zero false positives and only
10/1170 false negatives by 130 participants [23] to only 2/5861
errors across 92 participants, both of which were detected at
veriﬁcation [24]. Moreover, the results of proﬁciency testing in
Australia revealed only 2 transcription errors (which were
corrected on checking) and only 7 ‘inconclusive’ decisions out of
782 comparisons over a 6 year period [25]. Whilst impressively
high, these data do however reveal that the performance ofﬁngerprint experts is not perfect [26]. Notably, experts out-
performed novices, but tended to err on the side of caution with
more false negatives (missing a true match) than false positives
(wrongly accusing an innocent suspect). In his own tests,
Langenburg [22] revealed 3 false negative decisions across
6 experts when they were the sole analyst for 60 comparisons.
However, when the experts knew that their decisions were to be
veriﬁed by a colleague, their performance across just 30 compar-
isons was weaker, revealing 2 false positive errors (all of which
were corrected at an unblind veriﬁcation stage) but 6 false negative
errors across the 6 experts (none of which were corrected). This
pattern was replicated by Ulery and colleagues [26,28] with the
latter study revealing that these false negative decisions can be
repeated by the same analyst upon retest, and can be reproduced
by different analysts on blind checking. Evidence also exists to
suggest that experts may be biased by the opinion of others. For
instance, Langenburg et al. [29] showed that the performance of
experts was affected in the direction of opinions presented as if
from another examiner or from an internationally recognised
expert. Whilst the participants in this study did not necessarily err
in terms of making deﬁnitive errors, they did err through a greater
tendency to reach an ‘inconclusive’ decision.
A more accurate picture of expert performance may, however,
be obtained from studies in which the experts are unaware of being
tested, and this has been achieved through inserting test trials into
their normal workload. Researchers suggested that this may
address the tendency that experts may otherwise have to exercise
caution when under scrutiny [30]. When this approach was taken,
a number of studies have revealed worrying levels of performance
bias. For instance, Dror et al. [31] tested 5 ﬁngerprint experts with
what they believed to be the Mayﬁeld and Madrid bomber
ﬁngerprints, yielding a strong bias for the experts to conclude that
the ﬁngerprints were not a match. In fact, the ﬁngerprints had been
previously examined by the experts and conﬁrmed as a match.
Nevertheless, with this strong contextual bias, four of the ﬁve
experts reversed their previous decision, with three experts
reporting the ﬁngerprint pair to not match, and one expert
reporting that the evidence was insufﬁcient to draw a conclusion.
In a similar study, Dror and Charlton [32] asked experts to judge
ﬁngerprint pairs given the contextual bias that the suspect had
either confessed to the crime (bias to say ‘match’) or had an alibi
(bias to say ‘no match’). The results indicated that when the
ﬁngerprint pair was similar and thus the task was difﬁcult, the
experts were swayed in the direction of the biasing information.
Finally, Dror et al. [33] demonstrated that experts can even be
swayed by the introduction of technology to the task. When
candidate ﬁngerprints were sourced by an automated ﬁngerprint
identiﬁcation system (AFIS), experts made more false positive
identiﬁcations to those ﬁngerprints towards the top of the AFIS list
where the similarity between latent and target ﬁngerprints was
presumed to be greater. Moreover, this error arose despite the fact
that the true suspect print was present lower in the list. A meta-
analysis of key results demonstrated that the effects were
sufﬁcient to be of statistical concern, indicating that ﬁngerprint
experts are good at their task but they are not totally reliable, and
can be biased by context [34]. Indeed, they concluded that the
threat of bias is real and unconscious, and may be of particular
concern when a procedure is only vaguely speciﬁed [9,35].
1.3. Transparency of the matching process
The latter work raises particular criticism of the speciﬁcity with
which the ACE-V method is described. Indeed, this is a concern
voiced by Haber and Haber [20] who suggest that the ACE-V
method fails to meet the standards of admissibility demanded of
the court in terms of both the deﬁnition of the method itself, and
1 The individual experts tended to use different terms such as ‘ﬁngermark’, ‘crime
scene mark’, ‘ﬁngerprint’ or simply ‘print’ to refer to the latent print obtained from
the crime scene. For consistency and readability, the term ‘latent print’ is always
used, and changes in terminology within the experts’ quotations are indicated in
square brackets.
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extent to which the ACE-V meets the Daubert criteria for
admissibility.) Whilst Champod [36] agrees with Haber and
Haber’s [20] concern, he notes that a lack of transparency need
not imply a lack of reliability. Nevertheless, Champod and the
Habers agree that greater visibility of the experts’ inferential
process would be of value both when reaching and verifying a
ﬁngerprint decision, and when explaining that decision to a court
of lay individuals. This calls for the sort of approach that Ulery et al.
[27] referred to as ‘white box’ research, in which the focus is on the
process taken by the experts, rather than the ‘black box’ outcome at
the end of it.
One step in this direction is provided by Charlton et al. [37] who
provided a qualitative analysis of the comments made by
ﬁngerprint experts during their task. Their ﬁndings revealed a
fear of making errors amongst experts, but also revealed the
considerable emotional satisfaction experienced when they were
able to make a match on a high-proﬁle, serious, or long-running
case. Whilst these insights are valuable in terms of the emotional
pressures and resultant motivations of the experts, they do not
describe the ‘white box’ process that Ulery et al. envisaged. The
purpose of the present study is to address this gap.
A mixed methods approach is taken in the current work with
Experiment 1 providing a qualitative view of the ﬁngerprint
matching process from the perspective of the expert. With the
process made transparent, Experiment 2 then provides an
empirical test of the reliability of that process. Finally, and
critically, Experiment 3 explores the question of whether the
process as described is sufﬁcient to enable a set of trained novices
to perform at expert levels, or whether indeed ﬁngerprint experts
rely on something more. These questions of transparency,
reliability and sufﬁciency are key in starting to address the
concerns that have been levelled regarding reliability and
admissibility. As such, the current work aims to provide the
forensic science community with greater insight over the
inferential process used by ﬁngerprint experts, and greater clarity
over training needs to support robust and reliable court decisions.
2. Experiment 1: Method
2.1. Design
A semi-structured interviewed was used to explore the process
used by ﬁngerprint experts when analysing a pair of ﬁngerprints.
This was followed by a ‘think aloud’ task to narrate the process
with a pair of ﬁngerprints. Thematic analysis was used to extract
the common themes in the experts’ process, together with any
idiosyncrasies reported.
2.2. Participants
A total of 12 expert ﬁngerprint analysts (6 males, 6 females)
were recruited from a nearby UK Fingerprint Bureau. Ages ranged
from 33 years to 56 years (mean age = 39.6 years, SD = 6.7), and all
were fully trained current practitioners. Experience was recorded
in terms of the number of years in role, and ranged from 2 years to
24 years (mean experience = 12.16 years, SD = 6.67). All partici-
pants took part with their supervisor’s permission and were tested
at their place of work.
2.3. Materials
A semi-structured interview schedule was used providing a
guide for all interviews. In this way, participants were asked about
(i) the ﬁngerprint characteristics used for analysis, and (ii) their
method of analysis itself.2.4. Procedure
Participants were informed of the nature of the task, and
assured of anonymity of reporting. Following provision of
informed consent, participants were interviewed individually
within a quiet room at their place of work during a work break.
The interview began with a ‘think aloud’ task in which participants
were asked to detail their route from the car park to their desk, and
to report the number of doors that they passed through. This
enabled the participants to settle into the task of articulating their
actions in sequence. Subsequently, participants were asked to
provided demographic details before describing the process they
used when determining whether a pair of ﬁngerprints represented
a match or not. Participants were prompted if necessary to describe
the most important characteristics, as well as any misleading
characteristics, of the ﬁngerprint. Following this, participants were
provided with a pair of ﬁngerprints on paper and were asked to
narrate their process with reference to that pair of ﬁngerprints. At
no time was any reference made by the experimenter to the ACE-V
method of analysis, ensuring that any methodological structure
was provided by the experts rather than being superimposed by
the interview schedule.
The interviews were transcribed verbatim, and an inductive
thematic coding approach [38] was applied in order to extract
common themes (and idiosyncrasies) across the experts. Data
immersion enabled familiarisation with the overall dataset and
supported the identiﬁcation of recurring patterns in the data. A
coding scheme was generated and applied to the full dataset, and
from these codes, common themes were identiﬁed, extracted and
named. Inter-rater agreement conﬁrmed the appropriateness of
the resultant thematic structure. Moreover, after the 12th expert
was interviewed, no new themes were emerging. Thus the sample
of 12 experts was considered adequate for the purpose at hand.
3. Results and discussion
Overall, the data provided two main themes: method of analysis,
and ﬁngerprint characteristics. The method of analysis described the
staged approach that analysts took when reaching a decision on a
pair of ﬁngerprints. Spontaneously, all experts described the
4 stages of analysis, comparison, evaluation, and validation (ACE-
V) and these thus represented the sub-themes. The ﬁngerprint
characteristics described the details of a ﬁngerprint that the experts
looked for, and these were described by 4 sub-themes (ﬁrst level
detail, second level detail, third level detail, scars and creases). The
remainder of this section describes and illustrates the experts’
process with reference to quotes.
3.1. The ACE-V method of analysis
All participants were asked to describe their methodology when
comparing one ﬁngerprint to another. In response, all referenced
the ACE-V method, and provided detail on each stage in turn.
Particular emphasis was placed on the ‘analysis’ stage which was
often referred to as an information gathering stage at which the
latent print (the crime scene print) is assessed both for its quality
and for the information that it yields. Participants noted the
possibility that the latent print may be too poor to analyse further.
Essentially you are looking for what information you can ﬁnd
within the [latent print].1 It could be that you could see a
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pores. It could be that you could see very little – just friction
ridges – just the actual lines. So, I am ascertaining what that
quality is, and how much of it is there.’’ (Participant 9, Female,
30 years old, 5 years of experience).
Participants also emphasised the importance of assessing the
latent print on its own at the analysis stage.
‘‘You take the [latent print] as an individual mark and assess it
on its individual merits.’’ (Participant 5, Female, 41 years old,
22 years of experience).
When describing the comparison stage, participants again
stressed the importance of focussing on the latent print before
considering the suspect print. The majority of participants
spontaneously and conﬁdently reported that they worked in this
manner.
‘‘But you would be analysing the poorer impression, and then. . .
and taking the comparison between that and the better
impression.’’ (Participant 9, Female, 30 years old, 5 years of
experience).
Comparison of the two ﬁngerprints was described holistically
by participants.
‘‘You are looking for dissimilarities as well as similarities. So it is
almost a bit like dot-to-dot, or spot-the-difference if you like.’’
(Participant 5, Female, 41 years old, 22 years of experience).
However, the ‘think aloud’ task enabled participants to be much
more descriptive regarding comparison process:
‘‘OK, so yeah, this again. . . Like we were saying, the pattern is
the ﬁrst thing your eyes are drawn to and these [the two
ﬁngerprints used in the think aloud task] are both very similar
patterns. . . and the deltas are both sort of equal distance from
the core to the delta. You can see that they are both quite
similar. Umm, what I tend to look at – my eye goes straight to
the core. Then I look for unique, umm, a few characteristics
around the core that my eye is drawn to.’’ (Participant 1, Female,
37 years old, 7 years of experience).
When describing the evaluation stage of the process, partici-
pants considered this to be a reﬂection on the previous comparison
stage enabling them to reach a decision as to which of three
outcomes they would endorse: The pair of ﬁngerprints is either
declared to be a match; is declared not a match; or the data are
deemed to be inconclusive.
‘‘I’ll then move to my decision-making – the ﬁnal stage – which
is the evaluation. So I am kind of considering ‘have I got
agreement’, or ‘have I got disagreement’. If there is agreement,
is it in sufﬁcient quantity to be able to step over a line and say
‘yes’ I have identiﬁed a [latent print of a ﬁnger or palm]’ or do I
have to say ‘no, I can’t identify them – it’s not identiﬁed’? Or
perhaps I can’t say for deﬁnite – it’s inconclusive.’’ (Participant
9, Female, 30 years old, 5 years of experience).
Finally within this theme, participants all described the
veriﬁcation stage during which a second expert completes the
assessment, comparison and evaluation stages to determine
whether the same conclusion is reached. As this stage falls outside
the activities of the ﬁrst expert, this stage is not reﬂected on any
further.
3.2. Fingerprint characteristics
Having discussed the process in general terms, the participants
then described the ﬁngerprint characteristics that they relied uponfor the analysis and comparison stages. In this respect, participants
described ﬁrst level detail, second level detail, third level detail,
and scars and creases.
First-level detail was emphasised by all participants. It
was described as the overall ﬁngerprint pattern, and partici-
pants described the deﬁning characteristics of the whorl, loop
and arch.
‘‘The classiﬁcation is the formal term for the type of pattern you
can see. So it is the whorl – which goes round in a 360, often
misquoted as ‘swirls’, but the whorls are the circular ones. The
arches look like the underside of a bridge. And the loops have a
direction to them – either the left or the right hand side. These
are probably the 3 easily recognised and very different types of
pattern.’’ (Participant 4, Male, 33 years old, 7 years of
experience).
Participants also described the importance of the directionality
of the pattern, emphasising the fact that loops may start either
from the left or the right, and whorls may spiral either clockwise or
anticlockwise.
‘‘Loops that have a direction to them – to either the left or the
right hand side.’’ (Participant 5, Female, 41 years old, 22 years of
experience)
‘‘. . . the conﬁguration of the ridges in the core of the pattern –
whether they have got like an anticlockwise spiral or a
clockwise spiral. . .’’ (Participant 3, Male, 41 years old, 10 years
of experience)
The classiﬁcation of a latent print by its pattern was described
as fundamental to the subsequent comparison stage. During
comparison, the concordance of pattern between latent print
and suspect ﬁngerprint was emphasised, and this determined
whether the participants needed to proceed any further.
‘‘Usually, if the patterns don’t match, it’s pretty straightforward
to make that call, in which case that pair can be discarded, or
you can move onto the next ﬁngerprint or the next person
depending on how you are going. So, if you’ve got a loop, and the
chap you’re looking at has got all arches, you can say ‘No’ pretty
quickly. If the patterns match, then you need to go on to the next
level of detail.’’ (Participant 11, Male, 34 years old, 2 years of
experience).
Participants also described what they referred to as the ‘core’
and the ‘delta’ within the overall ﬁngerprint pattern. All
participants noted the importance of locating the delta, and
comparing the distance between the delta and the core across the
two ﬁngerprints under consideration at the comparison stage.
‘‘you don’t get a delta on an arch because of the nature of the
pattern, but when you have a loop or a whorl type pattern, the
way the ridges are formed and the directions that they take,
they can form what’s called a delta, which is where three ridges
will form to a point – and that’s known as the delta. And on a
loop pattern, you’d have one delta. And on a whorl pattern,
you’d have two deltas. And where those deltas are in relation to
what’s called the core of the pattern, which is the tightest
innermost re-curve of the loop of the ridges, then you can use
that to help with your comparison and make a decision whether
they’re identiﬁed or not by counting [ridges] from the delta to
the core. So in relation to where the delta is to other parts of the
pattern, they can be used for identiﬁcation.’’ (Participant 12,
Male, 56 years old, 24 years of experience)
Second level detail: All participants described the second level of
detail that they relied upon when examining a latent print and
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bifurcations (splits in individual ridges) and ridge endings.
‘‘Once you’ve established that the pattern is the same, and the
distance between the core and deltas is the same, you can look
at second level detail which is the ridge endings and
bifurcations – so basically, just where the ridges stop and split
– and what you’re looking to see is that they’re in the same
relative position to each other.’’ (Participant 4; Male; 33 years
old; 7 years of experience)
Third level detail: All participants mentioned third level details
in their ﬁngerprint analysis. This refers to features such as sweat
pores. Whilst a match (or otherwise) may be determined without
this level of detail, participants were keen to describe both the
value and the limitations associated with this third level of detail.
‘‘Then you could move onto something called third level detail
which is looking at individual ridge units perhaps or looking at
the relative positions of pores, which would be poreoscopy and/
or the shape of the edges of the ridge, which is something called
edgeoscopy, which we don’t do very much because usually we
can make an identiﬁcation based on the pattern and the ridge
endings and bifurcations.’’ (Participant 8; Female; 44 years old;
14 years of experience)
Creases and scars: Finally, all participants reﬂected on the value
(or otherwise) of features such as creases and scars. Their
comments centred on the issue of availability of the features
given variation in the methods of obtaining ﬁngerprints, and
variation in the resultant ﬁngerprint quality.
‘‘You could have creases available. Obviously you have creases
in your hands where there’s ﬂexion, so on the inside of the
knuckles and also across the palm you end up with a set of
creases which run in certain directions. Also due to age and use
of the hands you’ll end up with additional creases going in,
which if they’re replicated they can be used; again it’s not
something you can rely on totally, but it is something else that
can be used to back up your conclusions. Creases don’t always
transfer because you’re looking at a control method, which is
the ﬁngerprint form; and the [latent print] itself, which is a
chance impression – it’s not taken with any kind of control; so
it’s possible that creases aren’t necessarily replicated in both.’’
(Participant 10; Female; 39 years old; 10 years of experience)
In addition, the fundamental issue of permanence was raised
given that such features are acquired following age or insult during
an individual’s lifetime, and can heal to differing degrees,
threatening their appearance at two discrete points in time.
‘‘In terms of scars, if it’s a deep-seated scar. . . yeah, then that’s
something that would be very useful because you might see
that there’s a scar on your ﬁngerprint form, but obviously if the
ﬁngerprints are taken ten years ago and the ‘lift’ is taken . . . ten
minutes ago they might have scarred their ﬁnger in the
meanwhile so there might be a scar on your [latent] print and
it’ll be perfectly okay on the [ﬁngerprint] form, so it depends if
the permanent scar exists in both [ﬁnger]prints.’’ (Participant 2;
Male; 42 years old; 17 years of experience)
4. Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 have been instructive in describing,
in qualitative terms, the process undertaken by a ﬁngerprint expert
when examining a pair of ﬁngerprints, and the characteristics that
they relied upon. Across the 12 experts interviewed, all described
the ACE-V method without prompting, and all showed a high level
of consistency in the description both of the stages of the method,and the of the ﬁngerprint characteristics under examination. No
idiosyncrasies were detected once variation in the manner of
wording had been accounted for by the coding scheme. As such,
these results provided two important beneﬁts: They provided a
level of transparency to the ACE-V method, and they provided a
level of conﬁdence that the method was consistently understood
and described across the ﬁngerprint analysts’ community at least
within this site. The current results also sit well alongside the
research of Charlton et al. [37] whose qualitative approach
focussed more on the emotional motivations and reactions of
experts during their task. Together, these two qualitative studies
provide a valuable insight into the inferential process, and the task-
related pressures, faced by the experts.
Whilst greater transparency and consistency of usage of the
ACE-V method will certainly help in cases involving an admissi-
bility challenge in court, it is worth reﬂecting on the comments of
Champod [36] who noted that the absence of transparency, and
indeed, the absence of consistency of usage, need not indicate that
the experts’ conclusions are unreliable. Indeed, he is at pains to
stress that the ACE-V method is a process of ‘good practice’ rather
than a prescriptive regime. Viewed through this lens, the
demonstration here of transparency and of consistency of the
ACE-V method is valuable only in terms of a perception of the
process but should not affect the evaluation of the outcome. This
said, demonstration of consistency across experts in the descrip-
tion of their process is worthless if they do not actually apply that
process towards a reliable outcome. The purpose of Experiment
2 was to see whether the ACE-V method was consistently applied,
regardless of experience, to yield reliable decisions.
5. Experiment 2: Method
5.1. Design
A 2  3 within-participants design was used in which the
effects of trial type (‘same’, ‘different’) and ﬁngerprint pattern
(whorl, radial loop, ulnar loop) were explored on a ﬁngerprint
matching task. Participant accuracy and speed of response were
recorded and represented the dependant variables.
5.2. Participants
The expert participants were the same as those used in
Experiment 1.
5.3. Materials
Fingerprint images were drawn from the Biosecure Database
which consisted of 8 samples of a single ﬁngerprint from
100 individuals. The 100 individuals were classiﬁed by the authors
into ﬁngerprint pattern types yielding three dominant groups
corresponding to plain whorls (n = 27), radial loops (n = 31), and
ulnar loops (n = 35). A total of 12 individuals were selected from
each of the three pattern types (yielding 36 in total) and these
represented the target ﬁngerprints. Each target ﬁngerprint was
depicted by two images representing a good quality image
(simulating the ‘suspect ﬁngerprint’ obtained from the custody
suite or the 10-card), and a relatively poor quality or partial print
(simulating the ‘latent print’ obtained from the crime scene).
In addition, 6 individuals were selected from each of the
3 pattern types (yielding 18 in total), and these represented the foil
ﬁngerprints for use on ‘different’ trials.
Finally, 12 individuals were selected spanning the 3 pattern
types and these represented the practice ﬁngerprints for use
during the orientation stage of the task. Four of these were used to
construct ‘same’ trials, and thus two images were obtained as
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trials, with care taken to match the ﬁngerprint pattern across the
pairs.
The ﬁngerprint matching task consisted of a practice phase of
8 trials (4 ‘same’, 4 ‘different’) and a main phase of 72 trials. In
constructing the main phase of the task, each of the 36 target
ﬁngerprints was presented twice, once in a ‘same’ trial, and once in
a ‘different’ trial. For ‘same’ trials, care was taken to ensure that
identical images were never presented. Instead, the good quality
target ﬁngerprint was paired with the corresponding poor quality
target ﬁngerprint. This selection of stimuli ensured that (i) the task
was not too trivial, (ii) the task more closely approximated that in
the real world, and (iii) the use of simple image matching strategies
on the part of the participant was minimised. For ‘different’ trials,
care was taken to ensure that the foil ﬁngerprint was always of the
same pattern type (whorl, radial loop, ulnar loop) as the target
ﬁngerprint, again ensuring that the task was not too trivial. (See
Fig. 1 for example stimuli for both ‘same’ trials and ‘different’
trials.)
Trials were presented, and data were recorded, via Superlab
4.5 running on a DELL laptop PC with a 1700 colour monitor and a
screen resolution of 1024  768 pixels. Within this environment,
each ﬁngerprint measured approximately 8 cm high  5.3 cm wide.
5.4. Procedure
Participants were briefed on the nature of the task, and
provided informed consent prior to participation. Throughout the
computer-based task, instructions were presented on-screen.
These introduced participants to the task, and a set of 8 practice
trials (half depicting ‘same’ trials) enabled them to locate the
response buttons, and view the quality of the ﬁngerprints they
were to judge. In all trials, the two ﬁngerprint images were
displayed simultaneously and side by side on the screen, with the
prompt question ‘Same or Different?’ below them. The images
remained on screen until participant response, with participants
pressing ‘s’ if they considered the pair to come from the SAME
individual, and ‘d’ if they considered the pair to come from
DIFFERENT individuals. There was no option to provide an
‘inconclusive’ decision. Feedback was provided on these practice
trials.Fig. 1. Example stimuli used in a ‘same’ trial anAfter an opportunity to clarify any queries, the main trials were
presented. These consisted of 72 trials in total (half depicting
‘same’ trials). The format of each trial was identical to the practice
phase except that feedback was not provided. Throughout the task,
participants were asked to prioritise accuracy over speed and were
reminded of the consequence of inaccurate decisions in the real
world. The experimenter remained in the room throughout testing
after which participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their
time.
6. Results and discussion
Accuracy and speed of correct decisions for the expert analysts
are shown in Table 1. From this it was clear than the experts
performed exceptionally well, as would be hoped. Indeed, there
were only 2 errors out of 864 decisions across the group, and these
errors were false negatives in which a matching pair of ﬁngerprints
was classiﬁed as coming from different individuals. Of interest here
was whether performance varied across the ﬁngerprint pattern
types, and whether performance was associated with the
experience of the ﬁngerprint expert. In order to examine these
questions, accuracy of performance was combined across same
and different trials to yield measures of sensitivity of discrimina-
tion (d0) and response bias (C).
A one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to explore
the ﬁrst question, using sensitivity of discrimination (d0) as the
dependent variable, and pattern type (whorl, radial loop, ulnar
loop) as the independent variable. This revealed no signiﬁcant
effect of pattern type (F(2,22) = 2.20, p > .05) conﬁrming that
performance was equivalent regardless of ﬁngerprint pattern.
Similarly, a one-way ANOVA on the response bias score (C)
conﬁrmed no signiﬁcant effect of pattern type on the level of bias in
responding (F(2,22) = 2.20, p > .05). Indeed a one-sample t-test
(comparing the overall level of bias to zero) conﬁrmed that there
was neither a conservative nor a liberal bias in expert response
(t(11) = 1.48, p > .05). Instead, performance was accurate and high
across the group.
In terms of speed of correct response, analyses were conducted
on median response time (RT), which has the advantage of
minimising the effect of skew often present in RT data. A two-way
repeated-measures ANOVA was used to explore the effects ofd a ‘different’ trial in Experiments 2 and 3.
Table 1
Accuracy and median speed of correct decisions (and standard deviation), together with measures of sensitivity of discrimination (d0) and bias (C) for expert ﬁngerprint
analysts in Experiment 2.
Whorls Radial loops Ulnar loops Overall
Accuracy on ‘matching’ trials 1.00
(.00)
.99
(.03)
1.00
(.00)
.995
(.01)
Accuracy on ‘no match’ trials 1.00
(.00)
1.00
(.00)
1.00
(.00)
1.00
(.00)
Median RT on ‘matching’ trials (s) 14.85
(8.61)
15.56
(10.34)
17.15
(10.46)
15.85
(9.42)
Median RT on ‘no match’ trials (s) 4.58
(2.38)
4.14
(2.01)
3.71
(1.79)
4.14
(1.96)
Sensitivity of discrimination (d0) 4.65
(.00)
4.495
(.37)
4.65
(.00)
4.58
(.16)
Bias (C) .00
(.00)
.08
(.18)
.00
(.00)
.03
(.08)
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(‘same’, ‘different’) on speed of correct response. This revealed no
main effect of ﬁngerprint pattern (F(2,22) < 1, ns), however, a main
effect of trial type was apparent (F(1,11) = 23.88 p < .001, partial
h2 = .69) with correct responses being signiﬁcantly faster on
‘different’ trials than on ‘same’ trials. This was to be expected since
the detection of a difference between the two ﬁngerprints can
terminate the trial faster than its absence. No signiﬁcant
interaction emerged to qualify this effect (F(2,22) = 2.42, p > .05).
In order to address the second question, correlational analyses
were conducted to determine whether performance was associat-
ed with experience as reﬂected by the number of years in the job.
Pearson’s correlations revealed no signiﬁcant association between
experience and d0 (r2 = .54, p > .05), between experience and
response bias (r2 = .54, p > .05), or between experience and speed
of correct decisions on ‘same’ trials (r2 = .05, p > .05) and ‘different’
trials (r2 = .21, p > .05). Taken together, these results revealed
near-perfect performance with no bias. Experts appropriately took
longer to report a ‘match’ than a ‘no-match’, but their degree of
expertise as measured in years of service had no inﬂuence on any
aspect of their performance meaning that those with 2 years of
experience performed as well as those with 24 years of experience.
These results were very promising in terms of a validation of the
ACE-V method. Not only did experts consistently describe its use
(Experiment 1) but it appeared to be applied to provide highly
reliable decisions regardless of the level of analyst experience
(Experiment 2). That said, it is possible that the experts in
Experiment 1 reported on aspects of their process that they
thought they ought to report on, and either consciously or
unconsciously withheld other details. Equally, it is possible that
their high levels of performance in Experiment 2 could have rested
on procedural elements that remain unspeciﬁed. Given this, a ﬁnal
test of the ACE-V method was to determine whether it was
transparent enough to be conveyed to a set of naı¨ve student
participants and whether, in so doing, the performance of this
trained group would approximate that of the expert analysts. This
test of sufﬁciency was the purpose of Experiment 3.
7. Experiment 3: Method
7.1. Design
The ﬁngerprint matching task used in Experiment 2 was
repeated within Experiment 3 incorporating two additional groups
of participants. As such, a 2  3  3 mixed design was used in
which the effects of trial type (‘same’, ‘different’) and ﬁngerprint
pattern (whorl, radial loop, ulnar loop) were varied within
participants as before, and the effect of expertise (experts, trained,
novices) was varied between participants. The expert data from
Experiment 2 were incorporated into the present design but wereanalysed for a different purpose within Experiment 3. As before,
participant accuracy and speed of response were recorded and
represented the dependant variables.
7.2. Participants
The 12 experts used in Experiments 1 and 2 represented the
expert group here. In addition, 54 student participants (30 females,
24 males) took part either on a volunteer basis or in return for
course credit. Ages ranged from 18 to 30 years (mean = 21.85 years,
SD = 2.8). Students were randomly allocated to either a ‘trained’
group (n = 28; 13 females, mean age = 21.92 years) or a ‘novice’
group (n = 26; 17 females, mean age = 21.76 years). None of the
student participants had prior experience or expertise with
ﬁngerprint analysis, and all had normal, or corrected-to-normal,
vision.
7.3. Materials
The materials for the ﬁngerprint matching task were identical
to those used in Experiment 2. However, a ﬁngerprint training tool
was developed for Experiment 3 as a way of instructing the
‘trained’ group. This took the form of a Powerpoint presentation
and consisted of the experts’ comments from Experiment 1 in
which they described ﬁngerprint characteristics, and their ACE-V
method of analysis. In particular, the training tool provided an
explicit focus on the stages of latent print analysis with clear
description of the three levels of detail under consideration. In
order to avoid potential misinterpretation, quotations from
experts were used to provide all explanation throughout the
Powerpoint presentation, and these were illustrated by the images
that had been used in the experts’ ‘think aloud’ task. The ﬁnal
ﬁngerprint training tool was veriﬁed as an accurate and useful tool
by a subset of the experts from Experiment 1.
7.4. Procedure
Prior to the ﬁngerprint matching task, participants experienced
training, or no training, as dictated by the participant group to
which they had been assigned. Those in the training group were
provided with the Fingerprint Training Tool in the form of the
Powerpoint presentation, and they reviewed the presentation at
their own pace. They were informed that the information would
help them to complete the subsequent experimental task, and the
experimenter remained in the room throughout this period in
order to answer any questions and assist with understanding.
Following this, the ‘trained’ and ‘novice’ groups completed the
ﬁngerprint matching task in exactly the same way as the experts in
Experiment 2. As before, participants were asked to prioritise
accuracy over speed, and were reminded of the consequence of
Table 2
Accuracy and median speed of correct decisions (and standard deviations) together
with measures of sensitivity of discrimination (d0) and bias (C) for experts, trained
students and novice students in Experiment 3.
Experts
(n = 12)
Trained
(n = 28)
Controls
(n = 26)
Accuracy on ‘matching’ trials .995
(.01)
.864
(.12)
.822
(.12)
Accuracy on ‘no match’ trials 1.00
(.00)
.795
(.15)
.644
(.16)
Median RT on ‘matching’ trials (s) 15.85
(9.43)
6.21
(3.85)
2.32
(.83)
Median RT on ‘no match’ trials (s) 4.14
(1.96)
5.79
(3.12)
2.71
(.99)
Sensitivity of discrimination (d0) 4.58
(.16)
2.19
(.65)
1.44
(.80)
Bias (C) .03
(.08)
.17
(.46)
.30
(.29)
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no more than 15 min after which participants were thanked and
fully debriefed.
8. Results and discussion
Accuracy and speed of correct decisions are shown for all three
participant groups in Table 2 and in Fig. 2. As was the case in
Experiment 2, sensitivity of discrimination (d0) and response bias
(C) were calculated and were used in subsequent analyses. Of
interest here was whether the provision of training would enable
the trained group (i) to outperform their novice counterparts, and
(ii) to perform on a comparable level relative to the experts.
Given the lack of any effect of ﬁngerprint pattern in Experiment
2, and the lack of any theoretical predictions concerning
ﬁngerprint pattern, data were collapsed across ﬁngerprint pattern
here for simplicity of reporting.2 Given the predominantly high
performance of experts, degrees of freedom were adjusted where
relevant when examining signiﬁcance levels to take account of
instances of unequal variances when comparing across groups.
A one-way ANOVA was used to explore the effect of participant
group on sensitivity of discrimination (d0). This revealed a main
effect of group as expected (F(2,63) = 92.45, p < .001, partial
h2 = .75). Post-hoc comparisons conﬁrmed the beneﬁt of training
in that the trained group outperformed the novice group
(t(52) = 3.77, p < .001). However, the trained group still performed
signiﬁcantly worse than the expert group (t(33.53) = 18.1, p < .001)
indicating a performance gap between the experts and those
students trained in the ACE-V method.
A one-way ANOVA was again applied to explore the effect of
participant group on response bias. This too revealed a main effect
of group (F(2,63) = 3.71, p = .03, partial h
2 = .11). In contrast to the
previous analysis, post hoc comparisons revealed no difference in
the level of bias between trained participants and novices
(t(52) = 1.19, p > .025) but also revealed no difference in the level
of bias shown between trained and expert groups (t(30.59) = 2.32,
p > .025). This suggested that the trained group sat between the
experts and novices without differing from either. A clearer picture
was provided when the bias shown by each group was compared to
zero via Bonferroni-corrected one-sample t-tests. These revealed
no signiﬁcant levels of bias amongst the experts (t(11) = 1.48,
p > .016), or amongst the trained group (t(27) = 2.01, p > .016).
However, a response bias was evident in the novice group
(t(25) = 5.33, p < .001) with a greater tendency for the novice
group to say ‘same’ than ‘different’. Overall, these results suggested
that training was effective both in improving discrimination and in
reducing bias amongst the trained group compared to the novice
group. However, whilst the trained group approximated the
experts in showing no response bias, their sensitivity of
discrimination remained signiﬁcantly below that of the experts
indicating a performance gap between the two groups.
Finally, a 2  3 mixed ANOVA was used to explore the effects of
trial type (‘same’, ‘different’) and participant group (expert,
trained, novice) on median RT for correct decisions. This revealed
a signiﬁcant effect of trial type (F(1,63) = 63.38, p < .001, partial
h2 = .50) with speed of correct response being signiﬁcantly faster
for ‘different’ trials than for ‘same’ trials. There was also a2 When analyses were repeated with ﬁngerprint pattern (whorl, radial loop, ulnar
loop) as an additional factor, a main effect of ﬁngerprint pattern emerged only when
considering sensitivity of discrimination (F(1.78,112.4) = 11.52, p < .001, partial
h2 = .155) with performance being better when judging whorls than ulnar loops
(t(65) = 3.25, p = .002), and when judging ulnar loops than radial loops (t(65) = 2.91,
p = .005) (see Fig. 1 in [50]). This effect of ﬁngerprint pattern was unanticipated and
is difﬁcult to account for. However, the effect of ﬁngerprint pattern did not qualify
any other effects with any other dependent variables and thus is not reﬂected on
any further.signiﬁcant main effect of participant group (F(2,63) = 23.47,
p < .001, partial h2 = .43) with experts taking longer over their
decisions than the trained group, who in turn took longer than the
novice group. These effects were qualiﬁed by the presence of a
signiﬁcant interaction between trial type and participant group
(F(2,63) = 48.71, p < .001, partial h
2 = .61). Post hoc comparisons
revealed a main effect of participant group for speed of response on
both ‘same’ trials (F(2,63) = 34.02, p < .001, partial h
2 = .52) and
‘different’ trials (F(2,63) = 12.23, p < .001, partial h
2 = .28). However,
the pairwise comparisons showed these to be characterised
differently. Importantly, the trained group took longer to respond
than the novices for both trial types (‘same’: t(52) = 5.04, p < .001;
‘different’: t(52) = 4.81, p < .001) suggesting more care over
decisions following training. However, the trained group
responded at an equivalent speed to the experts only on ‘different’
trials (t(38) = 1.68, ns), but took signiﬁcantly less time than the
experts when making ‘same’ decisions (t(12.6) = 3.43, p = .005)
suggesting that they did not wait to amass as much supporting
evidence for their ‘same’ decisions as did the experts.
Taken together, these results provided a mixed picture. On the
one hand training was effective in supporting better performance
in the trained group compared to the novice group. Sensitivity of
discrimination was higher, bias in responding was removed, and
trained participants appropriately took longer over their decisions.
On the other hand, the performance of the trained group did not
approximate that of the experts. In fact, there was still a signiﬁcant
performance gap in terms of sensitivity of discrimination, and in
terms of taking sufﬁcient time to reach a robust decision on
‘matching’ trials. These differences were perhaps to be expected
given that expertise takes time to develop through practice,
feedback, reﬁnement, and repetition. Nevertheless, they suggest
that mere knowledge of the ACE-V method is not sufﬁcient in
demonstrating expertise in a ﬁngerprint matching task.
9. General discussion
The purpose of the current work was to provide some
transparency to the process used by ﬁngerprint experts, and to
provide some reassurance as to the reliability of their decisions. In
this regard, a mixed-methods approach has been valuable here,
with Experiment 1 using a qualitative approach to better describe
the method used, and Experiments 2 and 3 using a quantitative
approach to test the reliability and the sufﬁciency of the approach
in yielding accurate decisions. In this regard, the results of
Experiment 1 provided reassurance in that the 12 experts
spontaneously and conﬁdently described a consistent method of
analysis in line with the standards of good practice outlined in the
ACE-V procedure. Moreover, they showed commonality in terms of
A: Sensitivity and response bias across participant groups in 
Experiment 3 
B: Response Time (in seconds) for correct decisions on ‘same’ and 
‘different’ trials  across  participant groups in Experiment 3 
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Fig. 2. Graphical summary of the mean performance shown by control participants, trained participants and experts (together with standard deviation) in the ﬁngerprint
matching task in Experiment 3. Panel A summarises the sensitivity of discrimination and response bias measures. Panel B summarises the speed of correct responses.
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showed a common appreciation of the advantages and disadvan-
tages associated with these characteristics. In terms of providing
transparency over the method of ﬁngerprint analysis, this study,
combined with that of Charlton et al. [37], goes some way to
providing a description of both process and pressure from the
perspective of the analysts themselves. The concerns noted by
Haber and Haber [20] over the lack of precision when describing
the ACE-V are, however, upheld speciﬁcally in terms of a lack of
speciﬁcation over the degree of correspondence required when
determining that two ﬁngerprints are a ‘match’. This is a point that
will be returned to later.
The work reported here importantly provides an empirical test
of performance of the experts via a bespoke task conducted with
the experts’ awareness. The purpose was to examine the
challenging premise that if the experts’ process did not yield
accurate decisions then it would be of limited value, and issues of
transparency or commonality would become unimportant. In this
respect, the results of Experiment 2 showed the performance of the
experts to be near-perfect. Thus, taken together, the data suggested
consistency of approach (Experiment 1) and reliability of outcome
(Experiment 2). It is sensible, however, to express a degree of
caution with this simple conclusion: the experts may of course
have reported a consistent approach whilst actually using a variety
of undisclosed methods. Moreover, their near-perfect performance
in Experiment 2 may well have rested on the analytic approach as
described, but it could also have rested on additional methods
either with or without their awareness. These concerns are
reﬂected to a degree in the results of Experiment 3, to which we
now turn.
9.1. Addressing the performance gap between experts and trained
students
The results of Experiment 3 are important in several regards.
First, they reveal the effectiveness (or otherwise) when training a
group of naı¨ve students on the method of ﬁngerprint analysis
described by the experts. This provides an indication of the
transparency of the process, and the ease with which it can be
understood by lay people. Second, by comparing the performance
of this trained group with both an untrained control group, and
with the expert group, it is possible to determine the degree to
which the described method is sufﬁcient to produce reliable
decisions. Put another way, it is possible to determine whether the
level of performance shown by the experts may depend on skills or
knowledge in addition to that reﬂected by their ACE-V description.
In this light, Experiment 3 provided a very interesting picture. On
the one hand, the trained group out-performed the untrained
novices producing better discrimination, less bias, and takingappropriately longer before reaching their decisions. However, on
the other hand, the trained group remained worse compared to the
experts in terms of discrimination, and length of time taken to
reach a conclusion on ‘matching’ trials. This performance gap is
important, and four potential explanations are explored to account
for it.
First, it is possible that despite their training, the trained group
simply could not do the ﬁngerprint matching task to the degree
shown by the experts. As an explanation this perhaps is merely a
restatement of the problem rather than an account of the cause.
Nevertheless, it reminds us that the experts may simply have a
greater facility when matching ﬁngerprints through practice,
familiarity, and considerably more experience with the task. In this
regard, the absence of any effect of years of experience amongst the
expert group suggests that there may be a threshold level of
practice required to demonstrate competency which the trained
students had not achieved, but which all the experts exceeded. This
said, it would be far more interesting to reﬂect on what this
expertise may enable rather than merely to offer a threshold
explanation to account for the current data.
Second, whilst all participants were reminded of the con-
sequences of poor performance in the real world, it is possible that
the trained group performed poorly relative to the experts simply
because they were not invested in the outcomes. In contrast, the
experts may have been highly motivated to perform well both
through their appreciation of real world consequences, and
through a potential desire to showcase their expertise. This issue
of motivation is one that is very difﬁcult for any laboratory-based
study to address, and indeed it may be applied to any overt testing
of experts, and to any studies involving student participants. In the
current study, it may well account for the apparent performance
gap between experts and trained students, although the fact that
the trained group outperformed the novice student group goes
some way to weakening its adequacy as an explanation for the
current pattern of data.
The third possibility is that the trained group were not just
unable to do the task, but they were unaware of their inability. This
is a metacognitive explanation rather than a cognitive one, and
rests on the insight that people hold about their performance. In
this regard, it is possible that the trained group did not realise that
their performance was sub-optimal. Consequently, they terminat-
ed the (matching) trials earlier than the experts, having amassed
less evidence on which to base their decisions. In a very real sense,
this metacognitive awareness of how well one performs may be
affected by having (or not having) a standard by which to judge the
degree of correspondence required when determining two prints
as a match. Experts will have drawn on their experience to provide
this implicit standard whereas the trained group received no
advice on this point. This is an intriguing explanation and points to
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performance. The trained group will have lacked any signiﬁcant
level of feedback (other than that received through the practice
trials), whilst the experts will have gained feedback through the
peer veriﬁcation of their daily task. This feedback will have enabled
the experts to check and ﬁne-tune their performance, giving them
a much greater metacognitive awareness of their abilities.
The fourth explanation for the performance gap between
trained students and experts suggests that the training provided
here may have been sub-optimal in ways that go beyond mere
advice and feedback regarding degree of correspondence. This
possibility recognises the fact that the experts may not have
described their process in its entirety, either because of a
professional pressure to report on the standard process, or because
there are elements of the process which may be hard to articulate
or may be unconsciously driven. In either situation, and despite the
training tool having been veriﬁed for its completeness and
accuracy by a subset of the experts, the training may have been
insufﬁcient to enable expert level performance. This account of the
performance gap is very interesting indeed as it suggests that there
may be more to the experts’ task than they have been able to
describe. In this respect, innovative work conducted by Busey and
colleagues [16,39,40] has revealed aspects of the experts’ process
that may be difﬁcult to verbalise. Speciﬁcally, Busey and
Vanderkolk [39] have used EEG recordings to demonstrate a
delayed N170 component when ﬁngerprint images are inverted
compared to when upright. This delayed component mirrors that
when viewing upright and inverted faces and has been taken as an
indicator of conﬁgural rather than featural processing [41]. Impor-
tantly, this delayed N170 pattern was only shown by ﬁngerprint
experts and was absent in ﬁngerprint novices. Similarly, Busey
et al. [40] have used eye-tracking to determine where the expert
looked during the ﬁngerprint matching task. When exposure time
was limited, the results suggested that experts showed more
accuracy on the matching task overall compared to novices.
However, they also spent a greater proportion of their time,
compared to the novices, looking at the latent print over the
comparison ﬁngerprint, and showed much more consistency in the
regions of interest that they focussed on. Of course, merely
knowing what someone is looking at cannot reveal what they are
doing, and Busey et al. [40] are keen to point out that the expert
may gain their advantage through interpretation rather than mere
acquisition of information. However, in documenting these
markers of expertise, Busey and Vanderkolk [39] emphasised
the years of training, and immersion in ﬁngerprint analysis, that
are required in order to show such qualitative differences in
performance. Consequently, the performance gap between the
experts and trained participants noted here may plausibly reﬂect
the gap between knowledge, versus expert reﬁnement of that
knowledge.
The current data also suggested another difference between the
performance of experts, trained participants and novices here,
which centres on the performance in ‘different’ trials. Indeed,
examination of the data reveals that the trained participants (and
novices) were fairly good in correctly saying ‘same’ on ‘same’ trials,
but were substantially worse than the experts at correctly saying
‘different’ on ‘different’ trials. This pattern of performance echoes
that seen by experts and novices in an allied forensic science
discipline – handwriting analysis. Indeed, the work of Kam et al.
[42] revealed better performance by 7 FBI document examiners
than by 10 control participants. However, their later work using a
substantial population of 100 experts and 41 control participants
revealed that the control participants were let down not through
their ability to say ‘same’ to matching samples but through their
inability to say ‘different’ to mismatching samples [43]. In fact,
despite ﬁnancial incentive to perform well, and ﬁnancial penaltiesfor each error made, the control participants made incorrect
‘match’ decisions on 38.3% of occasions compared to an error rate
of 6.5% as shown by the experts. One might conclude that the
novices did not know what differences to look for, and thus all
samples looked highly similar causing good performance when the
samples were indeed from the same person, but poor performance
when the samples were from different people. Additionally, the
novices may have overlooked perceived differences as unimpor-
tant when the samples were from different people. This observa-
tion reinforces Busey et al. [40] point regarding a difference in
interpretation, as well as a difference in perception, when
accounting for the performance gap between experts and novices
Taken together, these results suggest that the expert may
demonstrate their expertise in ways that are not captured by the
ACE-V method alone. Speciﬁcally, the experts may adopt a more
superior conﬁgural processing approach, and may adopt a longer
and more focussed looking pattern compared to novices meaning
that they are able to acquire and make better use of the
information that they are provided with. In this regard, the results
offer reassurance in suggesting that ﬁngerprint experts do possess
skills beyond that of the novice. However, they also suggest that
there would be value in even greater transparency and under-
standing regarding those additional aspects of the experts’ process.
9.2. Future work
In terms of future work to deﬁne the expert’s process more
fully, one approach is to borrow from the methodological
playbook used by face researchers, where a relatively mature
literature exists in exploring expertise effects. Of particular
interest may be the examination of categorical perception effects
amongst experts. Categorical perception describes the capacity to
differentiate highly similar stimuli such that an abrupt perceptual
shift is reported between instances of one stimulus and instances
of another [44]. The classic example is the perception of light in
which we see discrete colour bands of red, orange, yellow etc.,
despite the fact that colour varies continuously along the
dimension of wavelength. Categorical perception has also been
demonstrated when distinguishing between the faces of identical
twins [45] such that that once each twin has been learned,
pictures of the twins can readily be distinguished into discrete
categories. Categorical perception is an interesting phenomenon
because it is underpinned by two effects – compression and
separation. In the context of the twin study, compression related
to a shift in perception such that images of the same twin came to
be seen as more similar after learning than before. In contrast,
separation related to a shift in perception such that images of the
two different twins came to be seen as more different after
learning than before. Put another way, compression relates to the
greater perception of ‘sameness’ within a category whilst
separation relates to the greater perception of ‘difference’
between categories.
Against this background, it may be expected that expert
ﬁngerprint analysts may show a classic categorical perception
effect reﬂecting an abrupt perceptual shift when discriminating
between instances of highly similar or confusable ﬁngerprints. In
contrast, novices (and to a lesser extent, trained participants) may
show far less ability to differentiate the ﬁngerprints. Of more
interest, though, is whether the expertise gap is driven by a
difference in compression, separation, or both. The current data,
combined with the ﬁndings from handwriting analysis reviewed
above, may predict that novices and trained participants may
adequately perceive similarities within a category (similarities
between matching ﬁngerprints). However, they may err in terms of
their ability to see differences between categories (differences
between non-matching ﬁngerprints). Thus, compression but not
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the observation here of a greater number of false positive errors
than false negative errors amongst the novice and trained groups
compared to the experts.
Examination of categorical perception effects provides one tool,
which may be of value in examining expertise effects in ﬁngerprint
analysis. However, if categorical perception is revealed, it would
then be valuable to determine the basis of such effects. Two
explanations have been discussed within the categorical percep-
tion literature, and consideration of both may be valuable. The ﬁrst
explanation relates to the beneﬁt that comes from having the
language to differentiate between stimuli or between elements of
the stimuli [46]. Put more clearly, experts may perform better in
their task because their expertise affords them the language to
describe, remember, and discriminate between examples. [40]
noted the beneﬁt that language can provide in that complex visual
patterns can be described, differentiated, ascribed psychological
meaning, and communicated to others, through the capacity to
label them. Novices, on the other hand, simply lack this language.
The second explanation relates to the beneﬁt that may come
through improved (expert) perception of the stimuli themselves
perhaps by noticing smaller changes along previously used
perceptual dimensions (increased sensitivity of perception) or
perhaps by noticing differences along more dimensions (increased
richness of perception) [47,48].
The application of multidimensional scaling to similarity
judgements provides one way to explore this issue. Multidimen-
sional scaling can enable the extraction of a similarity space within
which individual ﬁngerprints are located according to their
physical properties along the dimensions that describe the space.
Similar ﬁngerprints will thus lie close together whilst different
ﬁngerprints will lie far apart in the space. Importantly, the analysis
will also allow a determination of the perceptual dimensions that
an individual may use when viewing complex stimuli such as
ﬁngerprints. The increased sensitivity explanation would suppose
that experts use the same number of dimensions as novices but use
them better, whilst the increased richness explanation would
suppose that the experts use more dimensions when analysing
ﬁngerprints compared to novices. Consequently, an analysis of the
dimensions used by novices, trained participants and experts may
represent a valuable step in future work and may provide greater
transparency of the expert process, with a clear beneﬁt for training
tools.
Finally, whilst the suggestions thus far provide empirical ways
to explore the expert perception of ﬁngerprints, consideration must
also be given to the area of expert decision making, particularly in
terms of the standard of sufﬁciency when determining a match.
Currently, this standard is left up to the expertise of the analyst,
and this standard may be reﬁned over time with feedback from
peers. The trained participants in the current study received no
advice, and no feedback, in this regard. Of course, a move towards a
quantitative expression of similarity between ﬁngerprints (per-
haps through a likelihood ratio or an expression of match
probability) would remove the need for an internal standard to
support a thresholded decision. However, until such a time, greater
transparency is required regarding these internal standards,
affected as they are by both the unequal consequences of false
positives over false negatives, and the desire to avoid mistakes at
all, as discussed by Charlton et al. [37].
9.3. A word of caution
Before over-interpreting the current results as providing any
indication of error rates or proﬁciency in the real world, it is
valuable to note three caveats with the current work. First, expert
performance was assessed with the experts’ awareness, and thismay have encouraged a different style of responding to that when
unaware of testing or when conducting routine casework. Second,
performance was assessed using stimuli which may be of higher
quality compared to the experts’ normal caseload, creating an
overly-simplistic task. This methodological factor was necessary in
order to avoid ﬂoor effects amongst student participants, but may
well have inﬂated the measures of expert competency above those
expected in the real world. Finally, performance was assessed using
a test in which there were an equal number of ‘same’ and ‘different’
trials. Whilst this experimental approach brings robustness through
having a good number of trials of each type, and through the
avoidance of prevalence effects, an equivalent number of ‘same’ and
‘different’ trials may be quite unrealistic (see [28]). For all these
reasons, the absolute levels of performance shown by the experts
should not be taken as indicative of their levels of performance in
their day to day task. Instead, the focus here is usefully placed on the
relative performance of experts, trained students, and the untrained
control group on a standard test.
9.4. Summary and conclusions
The current work has presented a qualitative exploration of the
ACE-V method as described from the perspective of active trained
ﬁngerprint analysts. It has also provided a quantitative test of
reliability of ﬁngerprint decisions based on this method, and the
sufﬁciency of the method as a training tool for novices. The results
offer reassurance in suggesting a common appreciation and
adherence to the ACE-V method across the analysts involved in
this study, and in suggesting reliable decisions as an outcome.
Nevertheless, the performance gap between experts and a trained
group of students suggests that the experts possess skills over and
above those captured by the ACE-V method, notably in terms of
conﬁgural processing, and an appreciation of the degree of
correspondence required before a ‘match’ should be concluded.
These ﬁndings offer speciﬁc guidance for ﬁngerprint training
packages, and suggest that even greater transparency of the expert
process is required, including some quantiﬁcation of the degree of
correspondence when determining a ﬁngerprint match. However,
such a recommendation sits alongside the current debate over how
decisions should be articulated. If the issue of degree of
correspondence is to be quantiﬁed (rather than remaining as a
categorical match/no-match judgement), it would demand some
baseline statistics on the number of individuals whose ﬁngerprints
would be expected to share any particular number of features. This
demands that we have proper statistics relating to the frequency of
ﬁngerprint characteristics in the population, or the frequency of
matches by chance, both of which do not currently exist. These
metrics are desirable if we are to move to a more quantiﬁed
standard to determine a match, and if we are to move towards a
more probabilistic way of reporting decisions (see [1,3,36]).
However, they require that we address a research challenge that
is quite considerable. Given that the current lack of transparency
regarding standards of correspondence represented one reason for
a performance gap between experts and trained participants here,
the current data add weight to the call for this challenge to be
addressed. The promise, well-articulated by Koehler [49], is that
the testing of the reliability of ﬁngerprint decisions will not
damage its reputation in court. Instead it will provide the
necessary evidence to support its robustness.
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